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29 JUN 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

VIA: Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: Deputy Director, Current Production and
Analytic Support

SUBJECT: Responses to DCI Letters to NID Recipients:
Status Report

REFERENCES: (a) DCI Letter of 31 May to All NID Recipients

(b) DCI Letter of 3 June to Delinquent NID
Recipients, Requesting Return of Back
Issues

1. The responses so far to the referenced DCI letters indicate a need to consider follow-up actions.

a. The first DCI letter was attached to all 156 copies of the NID disseminated externally, asking each recipient to respond by 15 June. To date, the Director of Security has received 40 letters. Most of these have been group responses, in which an individual control office has responded for several NID recipients for whom it serves as control point. Nonetheless, even by the most generous interpretation the responses we have received to date account for only 111 of the designated NID readers. (Most of those unaccounted for are for the White House and NSC Staff.)

- A decision is needed as to what action is to be taken toward those recipients from whom there has been no response of any kind. (A list of these addressees and a discussion of options is at Tab B.)
- There also needs to be a decision as to whether the single letters covering several NID addressees are to be considered acceptable responses to the intent of the DCI's letter, and what action should be taken in the case of any that are not

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judged to be acceptable. (The response from the Director, INR, shown at Tab B, seems to be the weakest. We are currently reviewing all the group responses in coordination with the Office of Security and will forward the results of this review in a follow-up memorandum.)

b. The second DCI letter, to recipients who were delinquent in the return of back issues of the NID, has prompted the return of a sizeable number. In some cases, in fact, back issues have been returned by addressees who have not yet responded to the DCI's first letter. A fair number of the back issues listed in the DCI letters have not yet been returned, however, and in the meantime the number owed us by some individual addressees has increased.

- A decision is needed on action to be taken toward those NID recipients who have not yet complied with the direction for return of back issues. (Tab C lists those addressees who are still delinquent, with the figures updated to 24 June.)

2. Beyond the immediate issue of compliance with the DCI's letters, the responses we have received have surfaced additional questions that will need to be resolved down the line.

a. Many of the respondents have asked that one or more members of their staffs (e.g., a deputy or an executive assistant) be added to the list of authorized readers. Some, in fact, have indicated that they have already been following this practice.

- We propose to resolve these requests on a case-by-case basis, in consultation with the Office of Security.
- We recognize that to rigidly insist on a "principal addressee eyes only" rule would cause an awkward situation for many senior officials, and probably would prompt many to act unilaterally with regard to sharing the material with members of their staffs.
- As a general rule we think that, under certain circumstances, granting an addressee in advance the right to show the document to one or two predesignated and named individuals on their staffs will put us in a stronger position to enforce an "only those named" rule, and perhaps

TAB A

NID Recipients Who Have Not Responded to the DCI's 31 May
Memorandum

White House

Manny Rubio
Jerry Bober
Robert McFarlane
Admiral John Poindexter

Office of the Vice President

Admiral Daniel J. Murphy
Lt. Col. Michael Fry
Donald Gregg

Department of the Interior

James G. Watt

NSC Staff Members

Gaston Sigur
Cdr. Dennis Blair
Robert Linhard
Lt. Col. R. Childress
Kenneth DeGraffenreid
Roger Fontaine
Walter Raymond
Gus Weiss
Geoggrey Kemp
Robert Kimmitt
Sven Kraemer
Richard Levine
Carnes Lord
Brenda Reger
Victor Reis
Major Ollie North/Robert Helm*
John Lenczowski
Col. Gilbert Rye
Al Sapia-Bosch
William Stearman/Richard Beal*
Charles Tyson
Fred Wettering
Col. Robert Lilac/Col. Michael Wheeler*

*Dual addressees. The NID copies for the NSC Staff are sent in a batch to Mr. Leifeman, TCO for the NSC. He then distributes them and collects them. He has elected not to send a reply in the name of the group of readers, but has instead left it to each recipient to reply independently.

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Office of Science and Technology Policy

George A. Keyworth II

Department of Defense

General John W. Vessey, Jr.
Col. John R. Stanford
David S.C. Chu
Admiral Joseph S. Donnell III
Admiral Arthur S. Moreau
General Donald C. Hilbert
General George McFadden

The Talent Control Officers for the following
Congressional Committees

Senate Armed Services
Senate Appropriations
House Armed Services
Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations
House Foreign Affairs
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

There appear to be two main courses of action which could be taken toward these NID recipients:

A- Suspend delivery of the NID until the addressee complies.

--The DCI's 31 May letter states that compliance is required "in order to insure continued receipt of the National Intelligence Daily." Nevertheless, some might argue that it does not explicitly state that this will be the consequence of noncompliance with the 15 June response date. This action, therefore, could precipitate some acrimony.

--On the other hand, it would clearly demonstrate the DCI's seriousness.

B- Send a second notice to all NID recipients, noting our failure to receive an appropriate response to the 31 May letter, and explicitly stating that failure to comply with the second letter will result in suspension of the NID.

--This course would eliminate the basis for any complaints that NID suspension came without warning, but would still drive home the DCI's seriousness.

--On the other hand, once the threat explicitly is made the options for dealing with noncompliance are more constrained.

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